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The Limits of Moral Argument: 





For generations, philosophers of punishment have sought to revise or combine 
established theories of punishment in a way that could reconcile the 
utilitarian aims of punishment with the demands of deontological justice. 
Victor Tadros’ recent work addresses the same problem, but answers it with 
an entirely original theory of punishment based on the duties criminals acquire 
by committing their crimes. The unexpected appearance of a new rationale 
for punishment has already inspired a robust dialogue between Tadros and 
his critics on many of the individual claims that, linked together, comprise 
his argument. This critique focuses instead on Tadros’ theory as a whole and 
the methodology he uses to support it. It proposes that Tadros’ argumentative 
strategy can’t justify his rationale by virtue of (1) the extent and complexity of 
the moral reasoning he invokes, (2) the counter-intuitive results his theory 
produces in an array of specific cases, and (3) the superiority of a negative-
retributivist account in which moral reasoning and intuitive judgments, 
and the principles and applications that flow from each, are coherent and 
mutually supportive. Victor Tadros responds to these arguments in an essay 
following this critique.
Keywords: Moral philosophy, punishment, criminal law theory, moral 
reasoning, Tadros
The philosophy of punishment covers enormous ground, but if one problem 
endures at its core, it is the conf lict between the utilitarian aims of 
punishment and the demands of deontological justice. They seem mutually 
1 I am particularly grateful to Victor Tadros for responding to this critique, to participants 
at the NYC Criminal Law Colloquium for their comments, and to Carol Steiker and Harvard 
Law School for arranging the symposium with Tadros at which I presented an early version 
of this paper. Thanks are also due to Jeff Alsdorf, Jeffery Atik, Claire Blumenson, Jeanie Fallon, 
Stanley Fisher, Gabriel Levin, Steven Nathanson, Derek Parfit, Pat Shin, Ken Simons, Rory 
Smead, Marion Smiley, Rayman Solomon, and Terrell Ussing for their comments and counsel.
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exclusive in theory, and may often generate different sentences in practice. 
Finding a principled way to combine them has motivated generations of 
criminal law theorists. This challenge has served as a kind of conceptual 
Rosetta Stone that, if met, might clarify much of the field.
The philosopher Victor Tadros has applied his considerable skill to the 
problem and believes he has solved it. In his highly regarded 2011 book The 
Ends of Harm and in papers since refining some of his views,2 Tadros offers 
a truly original justification for state punishment, and does so with impressive 
depth and clarity. The astonishing advent of a new moral account of 
punishment has already inspired three journals to publish symposia on its 
merits, and prompted punishment theorists to revisit widely varied areas 
of the field. Tadros and his critics have commenced a robust dialogue on 
many of the individual claims that, linked together, comprise his argument. 
I join that endeavor in Part 1(B), infra, enumerating what I see as weak or 
missing links in Tadros’ argument. 
Although I raise these substantive objections to particular claims, my 
principal interest is in the argument as a whole, and the methodology Tadros 
uses to construct it – subjects that are necessarily excluded from the piecemeal 
analyses that have occupied Tadros and his interlocutors to date. A central 
claim is that this methodology is out of balance: it places too much faith in 
conceptual argument and too little in intuitive moral judgment; its extreme 
reliance on distended chains of reasoning leaves no role for deeply held 
convictions about specific cases.3 One can’t reach an end-point of reflective 
equilibrium with such a methodology, and I believe this, more than any 
2 Tadros has developed and in some respects revised his theory in response to critics 
(2012; 2013; 2015a) and in his Response to this critique (2015b). 
3 Rawls distinguished three categories of normative beliefs that should play a role in the 
method of moral reasoning he called Wide Reflective Equilibrium: considered judgments about 
specific cases, moral principles and rules, and moral theories (Rawls 1971: 19-21, 48-51). The 
distinctions are orthogonal and overlapping, however, because we may also have considered 
judgments about moral principles and theories (Rawls 1999: 286, 289; also see Brun 2014). 
“Considered judgments” are akin but not identical to what others call “pre-theoretical 
convictions” or “moral intuitions.” As an example, one might believe that slavery to be immoral 
(A) by virtue of an intuitive conviction that such is the case, or (B) by inference from other beliefs 
that yield that conclusion; judgment “A” would qualify as a considered judgment in Rawls’ usage 
if it also satisfied certain epistemological safeguards – stability over time, relevant knowledge, 
impartiality, etc.. “Considered judgments about specific cases” thus supply two ingredients to 
moral inquiry, both integral to the method of ref lective equilibrium: moral convictions 
regarding particular cases, which in their specificity can act as a check on more general 
principles and theories (and vice versa); and moral intuitions as provisionally credible sources 
of moral knowledge. Both dimensions of a moral belief are important to my critique. Regarding 
its degree of generality, section 3 argues that specific sentences the Duty View would generate 
are so unacceptable as to warrant rejecting the theory. Regarding its grounding, section 2 argues 
that intuitive moral judgments matter, and cast more doubt on Tadros’ counter-intuitive 
conclusion than his distended chain of inferential reasoning can support.
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particular weakness in Tadros’ reasoning, accounts for the theory’s failure 
to persuade the numerous commentators who have sought to pick his 
argument apart. 
Methodological imbalance is not a problem for Tadros alone, but constitutes 
an occupational hazard for moral and legal philosophy generally, given that 
conceptual argument is at the heart of what philosophers and lawyers are 
trained to do. But Tadros’ argument is an especially fruitful example with 
which to consider the use of reason, intuition and judgment in moral 
argumentation generally: it is precisely because Tadros’ moral reasoning is 
so exhaustive, accomplished and transparent that its frailties and limits come 
into view. 
This study proceeds as follows. Part 1 describes Tadros’ justificatory 
theory of punishment, distilling his argument down to eleven sequential 
steps and identifying several weak or missing links among them. The 
balance of the article puts these piecemeal critiques aside and evaluates 
the methodology and strength of the argument as a whole. Part 2 argues 
that Tadros’ argumentative strategy can’t take him as far as he seeks to go, 
simply by virtue of the extent and complexity of the moral reasoning he 
invokes. Part 3 demonstrates the counter-intuitive results his theory would 
produce in an array of specific cases, and argues that results so at odds 
with strong and settled convictions count heavily against that theory. 
Finally, Part 4 demonstrates that an alternative – a form of negative 
retributivism -- remains more persuasive than Tadros’ theory because it leaves 
us in a position of reflective equilibrium, in which moral reasoning and 
intuitive convictions, and the principles and applications that flow from 
each, are coherent and mutually supportive. 
1. TADROS’ THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
On one view, punishment is justified by the intrinsic goodness of a criminal’s 
suffering in proportion to his desert. Tadros entirely rejects this idea; he 
believes that no one deserves to suffer and that suffering is never valuable 
in itself, whomever it aff licts. For Tadros, the only possible ground for 
punishing someone lies in its beneficial effects. His rationale for punishment 
is exclusively instrumental. 
Tadros calls his philosophy of punishment “instrumentalist” rather 
than “consequentialist” because he wants to distinguish clearly between 
his justification of punishment and the comprehensive theory of morality 
known as consequentialism (2011: 25, 39-40). Were his theory consequentialist 
in the latter sense, he would face the familiar devastating objection: because 
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results are all that count, the theory could require imprisoning a mobster’s 
innocent mother when there would be utility in doing so, and even her 
execution if it would deter more killings than the one it would inflict. This 
is unacceptable to Tadros, but so is the retributivist solution that grounds 
punishment in the offender’s desert. 
Tadros’ third way is a hybrid position: an instrumentalist rationale for 
punishment situated within a non-consequentialist moral theory. He insists 
that the value of punishment lies in its deterrent impact, but also recognizes 
deontological side constraints on pursuing it – most importantly, the Means 
Principle prohibition on using a person merely as a means to another’s benefit 
(13, 23). In Tadros’ telling, this constraint places very stringent limits on 
government actions (so much so that only a libertarian state would seem to 
comply with it.4) We punish in order to reduce crime, but the Means Principle 
restricts its infliction to the guilty, Tadros claims, because only the guilty 
have a duty to submit to it. For that reason, Tadros calls his theory the “Duty 
View” of punishment.
Of course, everything depends on establishing that this duty exists, and 
that it derives from something other than desert. (Otherwise all Tadros has 
done is change words, substituting a “duty to suffer punishment” for “just 
deserts.”) Tadros’ starting point is the example of one person attacking 
another: uncontroversially, the assailant is morally liable to be harmed by 
defensive force. Tadros then argues that if the assailant completes the 
crime, his liability to suffer harm persists, extending to a series of residual 
and remedial duties that culminate in a duty to deter crime by submitting 
to punishment.
4 Tadros argues that the state may not tax people to finance retributive punishments, 
both because (1) liberal neutrality would rule out compelling people to finance a controversial, 
non-neutral conception of the good, and in any case, (2) citizens are not bound to expend 
resources to pursue the good unless they have a duty to do so (2011: 79-83). He argues that 
measures protecting people from crimes are not subject to either objection, because citizens 
have rights to security that create co-relative duties to provide it (82-3). By contrast, he 
classifies retributive justice as an impersonal good and “it is much more difficult to justify 
forcing a person to make a contribution to the pursuit of goods that are not grounded in the 
rights of others,” like the promotion of natural beauty, because each citizen is entitled not to 
pursue them (81).
Of course, this objection would eliminate large areas of government funding well beyond 
the promotion of natural beauty or the arts. Massive infrastructure projects like America’s 
rural electrification project in the ‘30s or interstate highway system of the ‘50s are also not 
“grounded in the rights of others.” Even funding such things as health care or occupational 
safety would seem to require a showing that people have rights to them and co-relative duties 
to provide them through the state. For that reason, the implications of Tadros’ argument seem 
to approach the strict libertarianism Robert Nozick (1974) propounded, and bring to mind 
Nozick’s famous claim that redistributive taxation is akin to forced labor. Compare Nozick 
1974: 169 with Tadros 2011: 79, wherein Tadros argues that to “use resources that a person 
produces for the pursuit of [a] goal is perhaps not as coercive as forcing them to work for the 
sake of that goal, but the difference is not terribly significant.”
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That’s a very long road to travel. How does Tadros get all the way from 
the permissibility of defensive force to the permissibility of state punishment? 
A highly distilled and simplified version of Tadros’ argument as I understand 
it consists of the following multiple-step progression.
1.1 Tadros’ Argument in Eleven Steps
Liability to be harmed by defensive force
I. All persons have a moral duty to refrain from wrongful aggression 
 against others.
II. If wrongful aggressor A commences an attack upon victim V, A 
  has a residual duty to prevent its completion or harmful impact 
 on V if possible. A’s obligation includes incurring a proportionate 
 degree of harm if necessary to thwart the crime.
Note: A's obligation to incur harm does not arise because he 
deserves it. It stems in part from a principle of distributive justice, 
the Choice Principle. On this principle, if someone must suffer, it is 
better that it be a person whose choice created the situation than 
someone merely trapped in it. (Whether it is “better” prudentially 
because we all have reason to value choice, or morally because it is 
fairer, neither view treats deserved suffering as good.) Here it was A’s 
choice to attack V that made the threat of harm inevitable (2011: 56).5
III. V (or a third person) may enforce A’s duty to avert her threat by 
 using defensive force against A that inflicts no more harm than A 
 would have been liable to suffer in discharging her own duty to 
 avert her threat. 
Residual duty to compensate victim by protecting against other crimes
IV. If A’s attack succeeds and harms V, A has a residual duty to provide 
 a remedy to the victim.
V. The remedy A must provide V is protection from future crime, 
 even at significant cost to herself, as long as that harm is (a) no 
 more than A was liable to suffer from V defending himself at the 
 time of the crime, and (b) proportional to the harm it would prevent.
5 Tadros (2011: 56) says that while the opportunity to avoid being harmed will often 
coincide with culpability, it is the element of choice rather than desert that is basic.
The obligation to submit to defensive force appears over-determined in Tadros’ theory. 
Whether the Choice Principle is necessary to his argument is left unclear given his sporadic 
reliance on the aggressor’s breach of her duty of non-aggression to justify, by itself, the residual 
duty to suffer defensive force that follows. If it is the latter, there is a question whether forcing 
the aggressor to do what he had a duty to do can fulfill the duty, because it may completely 
bypass the aggressor’s agency.  (See Duff 2013: 116-117.)




has just shot V when A
2
 arrives on the scene 
and independently attempts to shoot V. V may use A
1
 as a protective 
shield against A
2
’s attack even though A
1
 was not responsible for 
it, based on A
1
’s remedial protective duty. While this uses the 
aggressor as a means, it does not violate the Means Principle 
because she has a duty-based liability to suffer that harm.
Regarding the specification of protection as the remedy, Tadros 
argues that monetary compensation is ordinarily an inadequate 
remedy for a serious crime, and often unavailable in any event, so 
something more akin to specific performance is required of the 
aggressor: to protect the victim against a future crime of similar 
gravity (2011: 2, 277-78).
VI. On efficiency grounds, criminal wrongdoers are obligated to pool 
 their protective duties and take responsibility for protecting each 
 other’s victims (193-94, 280). 
Note: consider two assailants, each responsible to protect her 
particular victim from a future crime. If each assailant is unable 
to protect the person she attacked, but is able to protect the other’s 
victim, both have an enforceable duty to do so. In the previous 
example, A
1
 was liable to be used as a shield to protect V from A
2
. 
As a result of this implied exchange, A
1
 may now be used as a 
shield to protect someone else.
Duty to submit to punishment
VII. If punishing wrongful aggressors can deter crimes against the 
 victims they are responsible to protect, they have a duty to submit 
 to punishment, subject to the same limits as step #5 (279-80, 291).
State’s exclusive right and responsibility to punish
VIII. The state may enforce a wrongful aggressor’s duty to submit to 
 punishment by punishing her (395).
IX. Because all citizens have a modest duty of mutual protection, all 
  victims are obligated to use their right to protection-through- 
 punishment to protect others as well as themselves (298).
X. For reasons of prudence, effectiveness and fairness, the state is 
 best able to fulfill the victim’s duty to punish. Therefore, all 
 victims have an obligation to transfer their rights to punitive 
 compensation to the state (297-99, 304-05).
XI. As the exclusive instrument of enforcement of both citizens’ 
 and aggressors’ protective duties, the state is obligated to punish 
  wrongful aggressors (293, 299-305).
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Hence the core principle of the Duty View: The state has the exclusive 
right and responsibility to punish a wrongful aggressor for the purpose of 
general deterrence, provided that (a) the harm the punishment inflicts is 
proportional to its beneficial consequences, and (b) does not exceed that 
which the aggressor was liable to suffer in order to avert his crime. 
1.2 Some Weak Links in the Argument
Critics who quarrel with a particular step in an argumentative chain often 
assume that the argument is only “as strong as its weakest link.” In fact, as 
the next section argues, an inductive chain of reasoning is not as strong as 
any of its individual links, however weak or strong, and this problem 
may prove fatal to an argument as distended as Tadros’. But first, with Tadros’ 
individual claims now in mind, it is worth noting some particularly weak or 
missing links in that argumentative chain. 
Step 5 - The prior step has established that if a wrongdoer does not thwart 
the crime he started, he must do the next best thing: he must provide a remedy 
to the victim. Step 5 specifies that “[t]he appropriate way to remedy that 
wrong is by providing protection to victims and other citizens against future 
harm.” (2011: 2). But that claim dismisses alternative types of rectification 
– monetary payment in a theft case, for example, or surgery and long term 
care in a maiming case. This move has spurred a fair amount of argument 
between Tadros and his critics which I need not repeat here, other than to 
note that nothing in Tadros’ further arguments obviates the two problems 
noted in the margin.6
Step 6 - This step seeks to establish the aggressor’s obligations to people 
he has never threatened: he has a qualified duty to exchange responsibilities 
with other wrongdoers, so that each victim will be protected by somebody. 
The duty to pool responsibilities is contingent on the greater effectiveness 
6  First, mandating a protective duty rather than permitting monetary or other 
compensation deprives the victim of any choice in assessing how she might best overcome 
the damages she suffered. In a theory largely concerned with assuring respect for the moral 
status of autonomous persons, why should the state arrogate this choice to itself? (See 
Tanguay-Renaud 2013: 154; Ferzan 2013: 193-94). Responding to this criticism, Tadros has 
argued that leaving this choice with the victim “may lead her to violate the duty of protection 
that she owes to others.” (2013: 307). As I argue later in this section, it is more likely that the 
state will violate its duty to protect the victim’s compensatory right by aggregating it with all 
others and trading off among them on utilitarian grounds. 
Second, the residual duty is supposed to be the next-best thing to fulfillment of the 
original duty, and it is far from clear that the victim would be better off with protection from 
a possible future crime than with a remedy aimed at mitigating or compensating for damages the 
victim has already suffered (Tanguay-Renaud 2013; Ferzan 2013). Tadros assumes monetary 
compensation is inadequate, but a remedy that is contingent on the possibility of future 
victimization may be more so. 
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of doing so. Suppose A assaulted V, and now wants to fulfill her protective 
obligation by purchasing a guard house on V’s street and spending hours a 
day there insuring V’s safety. Assuming A’s work is sufficiently onerous so 
that it not only provides the protection but also exacts the degree of harm 
A could be required to bear, is A then exempt from the exchange, and thereby 
lacking the special duties to protect other victims that would ground A’s 
liability to punishment? If so, punishment will be imposed unequally, based 
on arbitrary factors like the wrongdoer’s wealth or the victim’s age.
Step 7 - Step 7 specifies that the wrongdoer’s protective duty is to submit 
to punishment. Having already established the wrongdoer’s duty to avert 
someone else’s threat – serving as a shield, for example - Tadros says, “If 
punishing each wrongdoer can protect other victims of crime from future 
offending, each wrongdoer ought to accept that he must be punished.
(Tadros 2011: 280) Assume punishment can protect victims from future 
crime via deterrence; note that Step 7 still doesn’t establish that wrongdoers 
are restricted to fulfilling their protective duty by that means when there are 
other effective methods available. Punishment is only one of many methods 
of deterrence, and deterrence is only one of many methods of protecting 
people from crime. We may achieve deterrence without punishment by 
increasing the neighborhood police presence, and we may reduce crime 
without deterrence through social work, job training, or other programs that 
ameliorate criminogenic conditions like poverty; so obligating offenders to 
undergo or help finance such programs might also fulfill their protective 
obligations. Given the suffering that punishment inflicts and Tadros condemns, 
he needs a persuasive argument to bypass such non-incarcerative alternatives. 
As this step makes clear, Tadros’ justification for punishment is entirely 
contingent on the effectiveness of deterrent punishments, a relationship 
that is notoriously contested and hard to determine; and if the required 
deterrent value is present, contingent as well on what other consequences 
might accrue, as Tadros recognizes (2011: 40; also see Ch. 15, sec. V discussing 
what consequences may properly count in determining proportionality; and 
30, 338, 348, 352-53).7
Steps 9 and 10 - Here Tadros seeks to transform the victim’s individual 
right to protection-through-punishment into a collective right exercised 
exclusively by the state. In step 9, he establishes that victims have a duty to 
use their right to punish so as to protect others as well as themselves, based 
on the modest duty all citizens have to provide mutual assistance to each 
7  America’s mass incarceration policy arguably resulted from an unduly narrow focus 
on crime control, to the exclusion of the social damage that would result from the removal of 
vast numbers of men from their communities, the diversion of resources away from policies 
that might ameliorate criminogenic conditions, etc..
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other (“easy rescue”). Step 10 then argues that the victim’s duty to punish 
includes the obligation to authorize others to punish if they will do so more 
effectively and fairly, and that because the state is such an agent, the victim 
must transfer her individual compensatory right to protection-through-
punishment to the state to enforce (301; also see 297-99, 302-07).
One difficulty with this two-step argument is that it depends on a duty 
of mutual assistance that can’t support it. At the least, the duty of mutual 
assistance morally (though not legally) requires a passerby to undertake 
relatively costless rescues, like calling 911 or throwing a lifejacket to a flailing 
swimmer. Does it also require that a victim’s compensatory rights be 
transferred to the state and transformed into a system of deterrent punishment 
benefitting victims and non-victims alike, as Tadros argues? That strikes 
me as a bridge too far. 
Even if the duty of mutual assistance could justify some loss in benefits, 
it cannot justify the loss of the victim’s right to the remainder. Although 
Step 10 is framed as a matter of more effective enforcement of the rights 
and duties of each victim, the state can only enforce them in the aggregate. 
My right to compensation for theft, and your right to compensation for 
torture, and all other victims’ compensatory rights, become subject to 
trade offs based on factors such as which punishments of which kinds of 
crimes will have the “biggest bang for the buck.” Rights may be defeasible, 
but they cannot not be subject to such maximizing cost-benefit calculations 
and remain rights.
Indeterminacy and Arbitrariness  A more general substantive problem 
with the Duty View is the degree of indeterminacy and arbitrariness that 
comes with the proliferation of a large number of duties and rights, each 
with uncertain borders and relations to the others. Among those that play 
a role in Tadros’ argument are a wrongdoer’s duties to thwart her crime, to 
provide a remedy, to pool her protective duties with those of other 
wrongdoers, and to submit to deterrent punishment; a victim’s duties to 
punish wrongdoers and transfer his right to punish to the state; and the 
state’s duties to protect citizens from crime and from unjust punishment. 
According to Tadros, some of these duties may fade over time as the duty-
holder becomes less psychologically connected to the person he was when 
he committed the crime. 
Needless to say, with duties as inherently broad, vague, and temporally 
unstable as many of these are, problems of interpretation and application 
are daunting. For example, when is the remedial duty satisfied and the debt 
paid? How should we measure the state’s duty to punish in proportion to 
the good that would accrue -- case-by-case, or systemically with all 
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punishments treated collectively? If the former, how would we isolate the 
effect of the individual’s punishment? As duties and rights proliferate, and 
as more than one applies (or is available to be applied) to a particular 
circumstance, attempts to define, apply and balance them will generate a 
large margin of error that, with successive iterations, threatens to take over 
the page. As I shall now argue, we get closer to justice with a discourse that 
is tied more directly to our moral intuitions and capable of finer distinctions 
than the abstract discourse of rights and duties that constitutes the Duty View. 
2. A METHODOLOGY OF DIMINISHING RETURNS
Let us now put aside these substantive critiques, assume that all of 
Tadros’ subsidiary claims are individually plausible, and consider how 
they operate collectively in an argumentative chain. I want to examine two 
inherent limits on the persuasiveness of highly distended moral reasoning 
of this type. The first problem is that, as a general rule, the more complex 
and lengthy the argumentative chain, the less confidence we should have 
in its conclusion. A chain of inductive reasoning is weaker than the sum of 
its parts. The second problem is comparative. When such an extended 
chain of reasoning is necessary to establish a position as revisionist as the 
Duty View, we may think that it isn’t enough to justify rejecting much more 
deep-seated and immediate intuitive beliefs. However strong the argument, 
it will lack plausibility if it is incompatible with fundamental moral convictions 
that are too compelling to doubt. (I leave aside a third methodological critique 
that has been persuasively demonstrated elsewhere: Tadros’ reliance on highly 
idiosyncratic hypotheticals to elicit far broader principles than they can 
support. See Husak 2012: 19) 
Consider first Tadros’ argument on its own terms. Its initial steps invoke 
certain intuitively plausible principles, such as a moral duty of non-
aggression; succeeding steps are mainly established inductively by taking 
a preceding step’s principle and eliciting responses to hypotheticals testing 
its extension. This multiple-step moral argument is essential because the 
ultimate principle it seeks to establish -- that state punishment is permitted 
only insofar as it may fulfill the wrongdoer’s protective duty -- is not at all 
intuitive by itself. 
This kind of moral reasoning suggests the construction of a building, 
starting with the foundation and progressing upward as each successive floor 
is built. It appears to make progress by addition. But addition is a misleading 
metaphor for viewing this kind of argument. Each successive step should 
reduce our confidence in the conclusion,8 for three reasons: 
8  Unless, of course, it adds to the plausibility of a prior one.
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(i) The longer the chain, the greater the chance for a substantive error to 
infect it. Each additional step brings with it an additional risk of failure. 
(ii) The second reason applies even if every step is highly likely to be correct. 
It reflects the mathematical truth that a chain of inductive reasoning is not 
“as strong as its weakest link” but weaker. The “weakest link” adage does 
apply to deductive reasoning, where the truth of the logically-entailed 
conclusion rests entirely on the truth of its premise. But Tadros’ argumentative 
steps are based on inductive inference, analogy, and intuition, none of which 
can supply the 100% confidence that logical entailment does. In this case, 
each step can only be judged more or less plausible, and each step makes 
the chain weaker by compounding the possibility of error, however minimal. A 
Bayesian calculation would treat each step as probabilistic to the degree of its 
plausibility, and the likelihood of the concluding proposition as a product of 
the multiplication of fractions, just as the chances of tossing two tails in a row 
are ½ x ½ = ¼.
We can illustrate how severely Tadros’ methodology undermines his thesis 
by assuming that each individual step in Tadros’ argument is amply persuasive, 
with all intuitive and inferential claims highly plausible. If we represent this 
arithmetically by assuming a 90% level of confidence in each of the eleven 
steps, the likelihood of the conclusion being correct is just 31%. We may well 
have more confidence in the brute conviction that only desert can justify and 
calibrate punishment.
Now this 31% figure is illustrative and subject to reasonable disagreement. 
One might deem some step unnecessary, or deductive, or so self-evident as to 
be incontrovertible, for example. But at least five of the eleven steps would have 
to be entirely discounted on such grounds to render Tadros’ conclusion even 
slightly more likely than not. 
(iii) Some may question whether this mathematical likelihood of error 
is sufficient to discredit a moral argument in the absence of specific 
counterarguments, or whether mathematical probabilities can be attached 
to moral judgments at all. But a third reason to doubt Tadros’ distended 
argument needs no mathematical proof to warrant acceptance: Occam’s 
Razor, the principle that the simpler explanation for a proposition is more 
likely to be true than a complex one, all else equal. Given its fruitfulness in 
directing scientific investigation over centuries, we need not be able to 
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explain why this principle is true to be justified in presuming it is.9 By this 
standard, Tadros’ 11-step argument should be rejected as unnecessarily 
complicated, if only because the same principle Tadros uses to justify the 
victim’s right to self-defense – the Choice Principle – would justify state 
punishment directly if punishment deters crime. If imposing the death 
penalty on convicted killer A will deter the unprovoked murder of B, the 
Choice Principle provides a reason to execute A because, as one of the two will 
die, it is fairer that it be the one who had the opportunity to avoid the risk.
In his response to my “diminishing returns” argument, Tadros does not 
contest the math, or the inverse relation between the number of steps he 
uses and the likelihood his conclusion is correct. He argues instead that all 
moral claims rely on the truth of many subsidiary claims, so all moral claims 
are vulnerable on this analysis, including the ones I propound elsewhere 
in this essay. My “diminishing returns” argument would lead to a general 
moral skepticism, he claims. (2015b: 58)
But that’s the wrong lesson. My argument is not an invitation to moral 
skepticism, nor a claim that intuitions are infallible, but an appeal to 
consider the relative persuasiveness of different legitimate modes of moral 
discernment on the question at hand. As moral argument becomes 
increasingly abstract and distended, the intuitive plausibility of its conclusion 
increases in importance. This creates a burden that highly revisionist moral 
arguments may not be able to meet. The problem with Tadros’ multi-step 
argument is that it culminates in a rationale that opposes the fundamental 
intuitive convictions most people have about the morality of punishment, and 
this forces us to decide which ground of belief is more trustworthy on the 
issue. This is one answer to Tadros’ claim that my arguments are as 
vulnerable as his own because they also involve multiple steps. The 
conclusions to those arguments - that it is unjust to inflict punishment in 
the absence of desert, and that it is unjust to the victim for the state to 
ignore his victimization – do not require us to choose between an extended 
chain of reasoning and our considered moral convictions.
The bottom line is that Tadros’ methodology places his conclusion in a 
less plausible initial position before any question is raised about the 
soundness of individual links in the chain. This doesn’t obviate exploring 
the merits of those links, see Sec. 1(B) above, but it does provide a substantial, 
independent ground for skepticism. 
9  Richard Swinburne (1997) claims that “it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle 
that simplicity is evidence for truth.” Some argue that this principle is self-evident, constitutive of 
rationality, or another kind of foundational truth that cannot be further justified. Others, 




3. COUNTER-INTUITIVE SENTENCES 
The last section examined the intricate structure of Tadros’ reasoning and 
whether it can support the principles he derives from it. If we examine how 
these principles would apply to specific cases, the difficulty multiplies. They 
produce results so counter-intuitive that something has to give. Apparently 
recognizing this, Tadros modifies the Duty View to make it cohere with moral 
common sense, but to such an extent that it largely disappears; as I shall 
argue, with Tadros’ many work-arounds in place, what remains is something 
very much resembling negative retributivism. This is not surprising, as so many 
obvious sentencing factors are easily understood in terms of retributive 
desert but invisible to the Duty View in its unvarnished form.
3.1 Losing Proportionality in Punishment 
Consider the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, recently convicted for his part in 
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured 
hundreds of others. The Duty View would prohibit punishing Tsarnaev if 
he were innocent, but is it capable of generating a proportional sentence to 
Tsarnaev given his conviction? I doubt it, unless we so revise our moral convictions 
as to make irrelevant numerous factors that Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
consistently viewed as important considerations in sentencing. 
For example, in planting the bombs Tsarnaev acted with extreme 
premeditation. Others may kill on impulse, or after being provoked, or by 
negligence, or by accident. Retributivism can explain the enormously different 
sentences imposed in killings perpetrated with these different levels of 
culpability: a premeditated killing displays a degree of blameworthiness 
that doesn’t exist in a negligent one, for example, and therefore deserves 
far harsher punishment. On the other hand, Tsarnaev was a teenager, and 
we are likely to think he therefore deserves a different, lesser sentence than 
a forty year old career criminal who committed the same crime. These 
factors have been important to sentencing judges because of their obvious 
relation to desert. Retributive sentences are straightforward in that way; 
most retributivists believe that a punishment should reflect the gravity of 
the crime and the blameworthiness of the perpetrator in committing it. If 
premeditation, youth, and prior convictions are relevant sentencing 
considerations under the Duty View at all, there is nothing straightforward 
about why this is so.
On the Duty View, we impose sentences based on many factors, but 
most centrally on the factors that governed the wrongdoer’s liability to be 
harmed defensively at the time of his crime. The two primary sentencing 
limitations are that the harm it inflicts on the wrongdoer not exceed that 
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which (A) he would have been liable to suffer from the victim defending 
himself (2011: 347), and (B) is warranted for the sake of the net benefit it 
will produce (333-34). That sets the baseline for the wrongdoer’s liability to 
suffer harm in punishment, which is then adjusted by many factors, 
including inter alia reductions based on repentance (347-48), the passage 
of time since the crime (347-48), the difference between “eliminative” self-
defense and “manipulative” punishment for deterrence (319-320), and the 
offender’s absence of responsibility for the threats his punishment will 
deter (348).
As to “A”, note that this proportionality requirement has little to do with 
the rectificatory basis that Tadros invokes as the primary ground for 
liability. The sentence is limited not by what would be required to make the 
victim whole, nor by what would now be required to avert a new but similar 
crime against him, but by how much harm the victim was permitted to 
inf lict defensively at the time of the crime. This seems to make the 
aggressor’s liability to punishment dependent on the factors that govern 
the permissibility of self-defense. Key among them are necessity and 
proportionality: the defender may use only the amount of defensive force 
that is necessary to repel the crime and proportional to the gravity of the 
threat it is defending against. There are other factors that may limit defensive 
force, but none of them are sensitive to the age, record, or culpability of the 
aggressor because those factors do not change the moral preference afforded 
the victim given that one of the two must suffer harm. Nor do age, record 
and culpability have much bearing on compensation to someone victimized 
by a crime; whether the aggressor’s threat is a product of negligence, recklessness, 
or design is not at issue, only the degree of harm that must be rectified. 
On the other hand, some factors that are relevant to self-defense have 
little obvious bearing on punishment. Most inapt is the self-defense element 
of necessity. A victim defending himself may use only the amount of force 
necessary to repel the aggressor, which means that differences in the 
circumstances – such as the type of weapon the aggressor is using -- will 
change the amount of defensive force permitted. If one’s liability to 
punishment depends on one’s liability to suffer defensive force, punishment 
may vary greatly among wrongdoers who are identical in every respect 
except the morally arbitrary circumstances in which they acted. The result 
will be sentences that, intuitively, seem much too low or much too harsh. 
Consider as examples: 
- A, a bank teller, embezzles V’s account. B, a purse snatcher, grabs 
V’s purse. Should A and B’s liability to punishment vary according to 
the fact that V is entitled to use defensive force against B but not A? 
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- A shoots V and misses, leaving V unaware of his narrow escape. V 
has no need to defend himself and no right to compensation. Does 
this have any bearing on whether A should be liable to punishment for 
attempted murder?
- A threatens V with a knife. V is able to retreat safely and therefore 
defensive force is unnecessary; but V fails to retreat, parries A’s thrust 
unsuccessfully, and dies. Does the fact that A was not liable to be 
harmed in self-defense have any bearing on what his liability to 
punishment should be? In his response to this last hypothetical, Tadros 
seems to argue that the permissibility of defensive harm does not have 
bearing in that case, but that seems impossible to reconcile with his 
fundamental argument against desert.10
3.2 Tadros’ Work-arounds
This mismatch between permissible self-defense and proportional punishment 
should not be surprising. Even if we assume the purpose of both is to prevent 
crime, the factors relevant to averting a wrongdoer’s imminent threat are not 
the same as those relevant to using a wrongdoer as a means of preventing 
crimes by other people against other victims at some time in the future. 
Tadros allows that the “transition from self-defence to punishment may not 
be entirely smooth,” (2011: 348) and develops a number of arguments for 
departing from the self-defense template he had adopted. The challenge he 
faces is to change the scope of punishment liability -- expunging the 
irrelevant factors and incorporating the relevant ones -- while somehow 
maintaining the self-defense rationale for liability. In my judgment it is a 
challenge that defeats him: the independent proportionality rationales he 
marshals become so ad hoc, and so divorced from the self-defense and 
compensatory grounds that preceded them, that we may wonder what the 
self-defense template for punishment has accomplished. Some illustrations:
Punishing environmental crimes - Most criminal codes include environmental 
crimes that cause harm without harming any particular person – for example, 
the intentional killing of the last member of a marine species. Duties of victim 
compensation can’t apply to such a case, so one can’t justify punishment 
10  Tadros says that V wrongs A because his defensive force was unnecessary, but that 
“given his wrongful act he is permitted to defend himself. It follows that there is no asymmetry 
between liability in self-defence and liability in punishment of the kind that Blumenson’s 
argument relies on.” (2015b: 71). This seems to contradict the central argument Tadros used 
to show that liability to defensive force is justified by the Choice Principle, not by the 
aggressor’s desert. That principle of distributive justice holds that if harm is inevitable, it is 
better that it befall someone who was responsible for creating the situation than one who is 
not. In this case, harm is not inevitable given the victim’s opportunity to retreat; and when 
he fails to do so, he is the person responsible for making harm to one of the two inevitable. 
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by extending the compensatory duty. But Tadros doesn’t interpret that fact 
to bar punishment of such crimes. Rather, he develops some much more 
direct grounds for punishing them.
On Tadros’ alternative rationale, the wrongdoer had a duty to respect the 
natural environment, and his violation of that duty may give rise to “a duty 
to protect that aspect of the natural environment from further damage. If 
the first duty is not owed to anyone, neither is the second…. Hence, it may 
be permissible to punish [him] to deter others from causing further damage to 
the natural environment.” But the duty not to commit a criminal act applies to 
all crimes, raising the question of why these grounds don’t obviate his more 
complex (and therefore, ceteris paribus, less persuasive) primary argument. 
Why isn’t that duty sufficient to ground a protective duty to prevent further 
such crimes, without relying on a particularized duty to victims at all? Richard 
Burgh (1997: 316) has made an argument along these lines, characterizing a 
crime as a social harm that requires the offender to compensate society 
through punishment. 
Punishing attempts - Similarly, an attempted crime does not harm a 
particular victim who has no knowledge of it. If the perpetrator of such an 
attempt is to be punished, it can’t be because of any liability to submit to 
defensive force or provide compensation to the victim. However, Tadros thinks 
these crimes can be punished because attempted crimes divert police resources 
and make everyone less safe, thereby establishing the attempter’s duty 
to compensate everyone (2011: 326-27). Alexander (2013) has criticized 
the factual premise of this claim,11 and Ferzan (2013: 185-86) has criticized 
its rationale, both because it offers no way to determine what degree of 
harm a wrongdoer’s diversionary act has caused, and because it holds her 
strictly liable for it. But even if Tadros could answer these critiques, his 
rationale would still dictate an entirely implausible proportionality calculus. 
For example, it suggests that attempted drug smuggling should be punished 
more harshly than attempted murder, given the greater police resources 
devoted to preventing smuggling.
Since publication, Tadros has turned to a different argument to justify 
punishing attempted crimes. He argues that it is implausible that “attempting 
to harm others makes no difference to a person’s liability to be harmed as 
a means…I do not see what argument could be provided for it. Even if we 
think that causing a threat is very important to ground a person’s liability 
to avert the threat, why should we conclude that attempting to cause harm 
11  Alexander (2013: 172) argues that because many failed attempts would go unnoticed 
but for their criminality, it is “ludicrous to assert that were they not criminalized, they would 
be causing us to devote security resources away from averting harmful acts.”
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is insufficient on its own to make any difference at all to a person’s liability 
to be harmed?” (2013: 320). Tadros’ intuition is clearly explainable on grounds 
of desert, but given his rejection of that ground, and the inapplicability of 
Tadros’ compensatory theory, I would argue this gets the burden of persuasion 
backwards, that the argument missing is his own.
Punishment beyond compensation - Attempted crimes present one of 
several difficulties that confront Tadros’ effort to justify punishment on the 
basis of the offender’s residual compensatory obligations. As commentators 
have noted, this basis also produces the unacceptable corollary that wealthy 
offenders may be able to buy their way out of punishment (Ferzan 2013: 
189-91; Walen 2012). Most people would find this unacceptable on grounds 
of inequality, but because their measure of inequality is comparative 
desert, that can’t be Tadros’ worry. His worry is that an offender who does 
not bear any significant cost in protecting the victim “cannot claim to have 
fulfilled his rectificatory duty….[f]or he would only have done what he 
would have had a duty to do independently of his wrongdoing” – the duty 
to rescue each other from harm if it can be done at little cost (2011: 286). So 
Tadros annexes an independent basis of punishment liability to the Duty 
View. He claims that:
our compensatory duties are fulfilled when we have done what is 
required to rectify the harm that we have caused. The duties that 
underpin punishment, in contrast, are not…Because I could have been 
harmed as a means to avert a threat that I posed as a result of my 
wrongdoing, I may now be harmed as a means to an equivalent degree 
to avert other threats, even threats of a greater magnitude than the 
harm that I caused (288, 291; also see 283-91 discussing punishment 
beyond rectification).
The question is, Why? Tadros offers two rather vague answers. The first 
is the analogical argument that because a guarantee of compensation does 
not obviate the prohibition on tortious conduct in advance, ex post compensation 
does not fulfill the offender’s duties either (2015a: 82-83). But this analogy works 
only if the reason compensation is insufficient ex ante also applies ex post, 
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and it doesn’t. That reason depends on the act not having occurred: at that 
point, compensation is second best to preventing the tort to begin with. Ex 
post no such preference exists. In fact, there can’t be a preference as to type 
of remedy, because both the compensatory and further duties are paid in 
the same currency - protection from future crime. 
The best we get is the discussion of a hypothetical -- Three Threats, described 
below12 - that suggests that committing a crime subjects the wrongdoer to 
conscription as a utilitarian means for crime control. Tadros’ grounds are 
that (1) the victim is in serious danger, (2) the offender is harmed to no greater 
degree than he is liable to be harmed to avert the threat he imposed, and 
(3) he could have avoided that liability simply by refraining from his wrongful 
act (2013: 303, enunciating these reasons for the Three Threats conclusion; 
2011: 291). But these grounds prove too much twice over. The first difficulty 
is that these grounds cannot distinguish between using wrongdoers to 
prevent crime and using them to supply organs or fulfill other important 
social needs. In order to avoid making the offender fair game generally, 
Tadros offers some exceptions to the above rationale; whether these 
exceptions are persuasive I leave to the reader to consider.13
12  In Three Threats, Tadros imagines that Bob has propelled a boulder that will 
injure Jane. On the Duty View, Jane would have been permitted to harm Bob to Y degree in 
order to stop the boulder, but the boulder is unstoppable. She can, however, use Bob to divert 
either Boulder 2 or Boulder 3, each of which have been pushed towards her by others. If she 
uses Bob to avert Boulder 2, she will avert the same degree of harm that Bob’s boulder will 
cause, at minimal injury to Bob. If she uses him to avert Boulder 3, she will avert twice the 
degree of injury that Bob’s boulder will cause, but Bob will be much more badly injured, 
though in an amount less than Y (2011: 289). Tadros argues that it is strongly intuitive that 
Jane may use Bob to avert Boulder 3, even though using him to avert Boulder 2 would fully 
satisfy Bob’s compensatory obligation with less injury to him (291). 
13  Tadros says that certain kinds of punishment will always exceed the offender’s 
liability. On his account, even if an offender was subject to lethal defensive force at the time 
of the crime, capital punishment is impermissible given the passage of time and the difference 
between eliminative and manipulative harm (2013: 308). What about the non-lethal harm of 
organ removal for transplantation? Tadros rules this out as well on the following grounds: 
(1) “It is wrong to harm a person to tackle a problem that is utterly different from criminal 
offending.” (2011: 354). Whether a particular punishment is excluded thus depends on what 
kind of differences matter and why, but we get no more than the conclusory term “different.” 
Without a definition, the criterion cuts both ways: others would find the difference between 
(a) harming a wrongdoer to defend against his aggression and (b) harming him to deter the 
aggression of others sometime in the future sufficient to make the latter impermissible. (See 
Quinn (1985). (2) “It may be that there is something special about organ distribution….
Perhaps using a person’s organs is a particularly pernicious way of using a person…” (2013: 
309). But again, without specifics we are hard-pressed to explain why incarcerating a person 
regardless of his desert is not similarly pernicious. (3) Institutional reasons to constrain 
punishments: for example, the likelihood that the institutions administering transplant 
punishments will act unfairly, the availability of less draconian but equally effective 
alternatives, and the expansive tendencies of criminal justice systems (2013: 308-09). Notably, 
however, all three grounds may easily apply to exclude prison sentences as well.
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The other way that Tadros’ reasoning proves too much is that it seems to 
leave the duty of compensation superfluous. Its justification reaches all the 
punishments that were previously grounded in the compensatory duty. 
The latter now seems beside the point - as arguably it should be, given that 
a victim may be fully compensated through the civil system.
Let us consider a different explanation for the intuition that wrongdoers 
have an extra-compensatory duty to deter crime by their own punishment. 
Daniel Farrell (2015) has argued that this putative requirement must be a 
duty of retributive justice; Tadros disputes this on the ground that “retributivist 
views of punishment are not grounded in duties of offenders, or the relevant 
duties have nothing to do with protection.” (2015a: 81)
I believe Tadros is right to deny that this additional duty constitutes the 
pure form of retributivism that requires the inf liction of suffering on 
offenders, because his theory prohibits doing so solely for that purpose. But 
I find it difficult to view his claim as plausible except as an implicit if diluted 
version of the negative retributivist theory I argue for in the following section 
– the view that desert is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment. 
On the Duty View, the offender has a duty to exceed compensation to the full 
extent of his liability to be harmed, but this duty should only be enforced if 
some utilitarian benefit will accrue. And on what basis does that duty exist? 
Not on the basis of either utility or compensation, because the duty exists 
apart from both. In the absence of some other specification by the author, 
it seems that the duty persists beyond full compensation because the 
offender deserves to suffer the additional burden. That seems to be the 
best explanation for Tadros’ statement that assailant Jake still owes 
something after he has fully compensated his victim Sally: “If Jake manages 
to benefit Sally at little cost to himself, we will have a sense that he has ‘got 
away’ with his crime.” (2011: 289). 
4. THE INEXORABLE SIGNIFICANCE OF DESERT 
I have just argued that the Duty View generates highly counter-intuitive 
instructions to a sentencing authority unless modified beyond recognition, 
and that retributivism offers a better account of the factors that must inform 
the proportionality calculation. This should count heavily against the theory 
unless its retributivist rival is itself lacking in some greater way. So we must 
assess the comparative strength of the retributivist alternative and Tadros’ 
arguments against it. 
Tadros argues that retributivism is not an option because it is both false 
and incoherent, and what intuitions seem to support it can be better explained 
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in other ways. His central objection, and the one I shall explore here, is that 
retributivism rests on a false premise – the premise that a wrongdoer’s 
suffering is intrinsically valuable to the degree it is deserved (2011: 26, 45).14 
But there are many retributivisms, and only some of them depend on that 
premise.15 Therefore Tadros’ critique cannot establish the Duty View’s 
comparative advantage over retributivism tout court. 
More specifically, Tadros’ definition does not encompass retributivists 
who believe that punishing criminals is at least sometimes a duty of justice, 
a claim I shall argue in part 4(B). Nor can it apply to the prominent version 
known as negative retributivism. Negative retributivists do not believe that 
the state should punish a criminal to the extent she deserves. Rather, they 
believe that the state must not punish the innocent, nor punish the guilty 
beyond what they deserve. For them, desert is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for punishment; therefore punishment is justified only if there is 
also an additional, non-retributive basis. 
Negative retributivists quite clearly do not believe that the “goodness” 
of deserved suffering requires the punishment of a criminal, and there is 
no reason to think they believe such suffering is good at all. But desert is still 
the central element in their theory: its absence bars punishment, and its 
presence places an upper limit on the permissible sentence. Negative 
retributivism illustrates the error in Tadros’ argument: one can’t eliminate 
the importance of desert to sentencing by showing that deserved suffering 
is, like all suffering, bad. We can believe this but also believe that the 
infliction of suffering in proportion to desert is sometimes justified as a 
necessary evil. 
There is a reason Tadros dismisses negative retributivism, but not, I 
think, a good one: he believes there can be no such thing. He claims that by 
its terms, retributivism provides a putative reason to punish the guilty but 
no reason at all against punishing the innocent, or against punishing the 
guilty beyond what they deserve. He further argues that if it did protect the 
innocent, the idea would be incoherent. The next section challenges these 
two claims. Following that, section 4(B) shows how a broader non-
consequentialist theory of punishment might justify both a limit on 
punishment (through negative retributivism) and an affirmative duty to 
punish (grounded on other considerations of justice), as one example of a 
theory incorporating desert that is not subject to Tadros’ critiques. I suggest 
that this theory is more compelling than the Duty View, given its superior 
ability to account for our considered sentencing judgments and its greater 
14  More precisely, Tadros believes that only a retributivism built on that premise would 
be weighty enough to justify an incarcerative system of punishment. 
15  Those that do include the theories argued in Moore (1997) and Kirshnar (2000). 
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coherence as a theory. 
4.1 Desert as Prerequisite: Is Negative Retributivism Possible?
Retributivists disagree about whether their theory commands punishment 
of the guilty or only permits it, but it seems all retributivists believe that their 
theory bars punishment of the innocent, and consider this a unique and 
powerful point in their favor. Remarkably, this is precisely the opposite of 
Tadros’ novel rendition of retributivism, which to him constitutes only a sword, 
not a shield. This follows, he says from “the very simple truth that the 
existence of a reason to do something does nothing to exclude the possibility 
that the thing (and more) could not adequately be justified on other grounds.” 
(2011: 36; also see 35-7, 312-13). He claims that only the Duty View protects 
the innocent from punishment. 
The oddity is that the basis for Tadros’ claim that the Duty View bars 
punishment of the innocent is identical to the reason retributivism purports 
to do so. That reason is the Means Principle. The claim in both cases is that 
only the guilty may be punished consistent with the Means Principle - either 
because only they deserve it (according to retributivists) or because only 
they have a protective obligation the state may enforce (according to Tadros). 
Given the parallel structure, there are no good grounds to claim, as Tadros 
does, that the Duty View bars punishment of the innocent but retributivism 
does not. 
Perhaps Tadros believes that the Duty View includes the Means Principle, 
while the retributive view does not. But why should he think that? The 
retributivist tradition since Kant has most centrally embodied respect for 
the right of autonomous individuals to choose their ends for themselves, a 
constraint that restricts punishment to those who will it on themselves by 
their own blameworthy acts. 
Tadros (2015b: 59) also argues that if negative retributivism did protect the 
innocent it would be incoherent because desert necessarily cuts both ways: 
I think that ‘X deserves O’ implies that there is good reason for X to 
get O irrespective of any further good that will be secured if X gets O. 
If so, there is no such thing as negative desert in Blumenson’s sense.
A negative retributivist may believe it bad (or unjust) for someone to get 
what he doesn’t deserve without being logically committed to the view that 
it is necessarily good (or just) for him to get what he does deserve (Wasserstrom 
1978: 309-10). But let us assume that Tadros’ first proposition is correct. His 
second sentence would not follow from it if any one of the following is true:
I. A reason may be overridden. An offender may deserve punishment, 
 and this may entail that punishing him is good in one way, but 
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 the net costs of punishment may be so great as to foreclose it. 
 Here’s an analogy: equality is intrinsically good in one way; if 
 achieving it would require redistribution that left everyone 
 almost as impoverished as the worst off were, doing so may be 
 bad in a greater way; therefore, whether states should aim for 
 equality in any particular case is contingent on the costs and 
 benefits it would produce. 
II. A moral side-constraint might bar the state from aiming to 
 cause offender suffering even when deserved. That constraint 
 would not rule out state punishment for other reasons.
III. Even if “X deserves O” entails that X should receive O, desert 
 will not require punishment if “O” signifies “forfeiture of a 
 liberty right” rather than “punishment.” The question here is 
 whether one can deserve to lose a right by his blameworthy 
 actions, and surely it is at least coherent to think one can. Some 
 of one’s rights may be contingent on respecting the rights of 
 others. Alternatively, blameworthiness may be the fairest criterion 
 for the distribution of individual punishments when a punishment 
 regime will produce enough benefit to be justifiable. There is 
 nothing unintelligible or inconsistent in recognizing both a moral 
 prohibition on punishing the blameless and a humane directive 
 to impose punishment on the guilty only when something would 
 be accomplished by doing so.
Rights-forfeiture theories differ over what rights a criminal forfeits by her 
conduct. Depending on the theory, she might retain rights against punishments 
that serve no utilitarian benefit, or inflict pain, or are imposed by vigilantes, 
for example (see Wellman 2012). There are many versions, but to qualify as a 
form of negative retributivism, the forfeited right against punishment must 
be limited to punishments proportional to the offender’s desert. 
4.2 Beyond Desert: Why Punish? 
The second and third interpretations conceive negative retributivism as a 
matter of principle – one that that limits who may be punished and by how 
much – but by itself provides no reason to punish anyone. If there is to be 
any punishment at all, negative retributivists must look to some other theory 
that provides an affirmative reason to impose punishment on an offender. 
Many negative retributivists find that reason in the utility of punishment 
as a crime-preventive deterrent. That hybrid view parallels Tadros’, except 
that the permissibility of punishment is grounded in desert rather than a 
forward-looking remedial duty. 
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But there is powerful intuitive support for another reason to punish as 
well: as Tadros notes, most people believe that “something is amiss when a 
serious wrongdoer is not punished,” even in the absence of deterrent value 
(2011: 276). In this final inquiry, I add this conviction to the mix and ask 
whether it weighs for or against either theory. 
If we credit this intuitive conviction as roughly reflecting some moral 
truth, we must ask what exactly is amiss. Tadros thinks it is the fact that 
“offenders who are not punished have a duty that is unfulfilled.” (276). The 
retributivists he targets believe it is the failure to inf lict suffering on 
wrongdoers who deserve it. One might argue that a negative retributivist 
who rejects both views, as I have, can’t explain this intuition and that this 
should count heavily against his theory. There are two rejoinders. First, even 
if true, that criticism would not count against the theory in a pair-wise 
comparison with the Duty View, which itself leaves a wrongdoer unpunished 
when deterrent value is lacking. Second and more importantly, a negative 
retributivist can answer that challenge because, unlike Tadros’ theory, nothing 
prevents him from combining a desert-based limit on punishment with a 
non-utilitarian rationale for imposing it. 
 Here is a rudimentary sketch of one possibility: a hybrid theory that asserts 
as state deontological obligations (1) a prohibition on inflicting undeserved 
punishment, and (2) a responsibility within that limit to impose punishment 
when required as a matter of justice to the victim. (Whether utilitarian benefit 
is also a reason to impose a permissible punishment is a separate question.) 
The intuitive appeal of the second element is currently illustrated by the 
demands for “justice for Michael Brown” by residents of Ferguson, Missouri, 
following a grand jury’s failure to indict the police officer who killed him, 
and by the startling number of similar cases since. What is “amiss” in such 
cases, and in a state’s refusal to sanction any grave crime, is the injustice 
that inflicts upon the victim: the devaluation for a second time of someone 
who has already been treated by the perpetrator as no more than an 
instrument to his ends. For George Fletcher, this constitutes state complicity 
in the crime that leaves “the victim’s blood…on our hands.” (Fletcher 1995: 
6, 205; also see Hampton 1992: 1684, 1692; Burgh 1987). Complicity may be 
too strong, but at the least, such state inaction betrays the protective role 
that largely underwrites its own legitimacy, and treats the victim as an outcast.
On this account, the state’s obligation to punish crime derives from the 
injustice it does to victims when nothing is done. But to be clear, this rationale 
for punishment is a qualified one: punishment is not the obligation, only a 
means of fulfilling it, and whether other means may also do so is necessarily 
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dependent, at least in part, on the social meanings that prevail in a culture.16 
In ours, many people believe that a long term of imprisonment is the only 
way of taking victimization seriously. Yet it is possible to imagine a cultural 
shift towards less draconian methods, such as fines, community service, 
house arrest now enforceable through the use of GPS ankle bracelets -- and 
even non-criminal restorative justice resolutions, in which case this justification 
for punishment would dissolve. 
To be sure, the Duty View is also concerned with justice to the victim -- 
unlike the prevailing punishment theories, which neglect the victim as an 
independent subject of justice17 -- but its conception of justice is quite different, 
and is contingent on its crime-prevention utility. Tadros believes that the 
state’s obligation to repudiate crime and vindicate its victims can’t justify 
punishment, (2011: 87-8, 91-2, 107, 109; 2013: 255) and argues that because 
a victim’s moral status “is incapable of being eroded through wrongful 
action….it is difficult to see why the obligation to protect people against 
lack of respect is very significant in itself” (2011: 108).18 But this misses the 
real stakes involved in a state’s response to victimization, and leads Tadros 
to severely underestimate its importance. What is involved is not merely 
the wrongdoer’s violation of a victim’s inalienable moral status, but the very 
existence of the victim’s civil status as a member of the political community. In 
the United States, it is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment to 
strip a person of “his individual status in organized society”.19 A state that 
ignores crimes against its citizens withdraws that status.
There are other hybrid theories, of course. H. L. A. Hart’s distinction 
between the utilitarian “general justifying aim” of punishment and a 
desert-based distributional constraint is perhaps the most inf luential 
among many (Hart, 1968: 8, 10). The only point here is to demonstrate the 
inexorable significance of desert in punishment as a restriction on its 
permissibility, and its compatibility with a range of affirmative rationales 
16  A further, necessary question, of course, is whether any particular cultural take 
on the requirements of justice may be morally unacceptable. Where permissible cultural 
diversity ends and moral imperatives begin is a vexing problem, and one that increasingly 
confronts institutions of global justice. For the International Criminal Court, that issue takes 
legal form as the question whether non-criminal, transitional justice alternatives are sufficient 
to bar ICC prosecution under its complementarity principle. Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 17, 
UN Doc. A/CONFR. 183/9 (July 17, 1998). Over time, ICC decisions on the issue will define 
minimum requirements for criminal justice systems throughout the world.
17  Consequentialism is concerned with the collective benefit, presumptively leaving 
the victim with no greater significance than any other individual; retributivism classically 
treats justice to the victim as if it were a mere by-product of, or necessary identical to, the 
punishment that is required to treat the offender as she deserves. 
18  See also 2013: 277-79, in which Tadros rejects Adil Ahmad Haque’s claim that 
punishment can be justified because we owe it to the victims; see Haque 2013.
19  Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 101-102 (1958).
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for punishment. What’s fatally counter-intuitive in the Duty View is its 
exclusion of any direct role for desert as a prerequisite to the permissibility 
of punishment. 
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the Duty View is unpersuasive as a theory of punishment, 
and that an alternative theory – one that recognizes both a defendant’s right 
against undeserved punishment and a victim’s right to vindication – comes 
closer to a point of reflective equilibrium in which principles, theories, and 
intuitive judgments cohere and support each other rather than forcing us to 
choose among them. Yet what a fruitful thing it is for the philosophy of 
punishment that Tadros has made his case for the Duty View! There are not 
many works within the field that cover so much criminal law ground with 
such originality, and even fewer with the potential to stimulate a new wave 
of thought on numerous issues in the field. 
And, it is to be hoped, not just in the realm of philosophy. One of the 
gifts of a theory of punishment as imaginative and revisionist as the Duty 
View is that it allows us to view our correctional policies through a new 
lens, rethink old choices, and discover alternative routes to security that 
don’t always go through a prison gate. That route, which the United States 
has traveled for the last half century, has left us with over 2.2 million prisoners 
and the distinction among nations of imprisoning the largest percentage of its 
population, five times the world’s average (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2012: 3). 
Tadros asks us why, and what we have to show for it. His approach presses 
us to take the suffering of inmates seriously as a central moral element in 
punishment, and in so doing, to consider alternatives. For consequentialists, 
retributivists, policy-makers, judges and others who long for a morally 
defensible criminal justice system, that is the best place to start.
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